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THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE AND FISCAL AND
ECONOMIC POLICY
GRHARD COL*
A question about the economic and fiscal functions in the Executive Office of the
President would not have been raised fifty years ago. There were, of course, the
economic and fiscal problems with which the President has been concerned all
through history. There were problems of farm settlement, tariff policy, of monetary
policy, of management of the debt, and of national public works. Each of these
problems was handled in one particular department of the Government, and the
President discussed the issues, presumably with the head of that particular depart-
ment. If he wanted to hear the views of others, the problem at hand might have
been brought before a cabinet meeting or, in some cases, the President might have
discussed the matter with trusted friends. There was, however, no thought that
the President would be given a statutory responsibility in these fields besides his
general supervisory and legislative responsibilities. Nor was there any thought that
the President needed a special staff in his own office besides the staff of the various
departments and agencies.
During the Great Depression, matters of economic and fiscal policy became of
paramount importance for the President. President Roosevelt tackled these problems
with the help of personal advisers-his so-called brain trust. He often used as
personal advisers not the cabinet officers, but some trusted men placed below the
head of a department or agency. In addition, a number of ad hoc emergency
councils were created. But no systematic attempt was made to provide continuing
staff services for the President in the economic and fiscal field prior to the Reorgan-
ization Act of 1939.
Timz BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING Aar OF 1921
The first major debate concerning staff services for the President in the field of
economic and fiscal policy centered around the President's role in budget prepara-
tion and budget execution.' Until the adoption of the Budget and Accounting Act
in 192I,1 the Treasury Department simply compiled the various departmental budget
requirements and passed them on to Congress. There was no executive budget policy
and therefore no fiscal function for the President to perform. The Budget and
Accounting Act made transmission of the budget a presidential duty. Thereby, the
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President became responsible for making specific recommendations for appropria-
tions and, under certain conditions, for changes in taxation, borrowing, or debt re-
demption. The promoters of this legislation fully realized its significance in the
development of the institution of the Presidency in the United States. Through
the responsibility for preparing an executive budget, the President would be given
an instrument which could help him in discharging more effectively his supervisory
and coordinating responsibility. Budget making was conceived not merely as a
financial function; it was envisaged as a means for determining the use of various
governmental activities in line with their relative importance; it was intended to
provide a method for supervising the effectiveness of departmental organization
and performance. It was to be a tool for implementing policy decisions. The
enthusiasts expected that the responsibility for budget policy would make presidential
leadership more real.
The Taft Commission, which began the consideration of a budget system before
the First World War, recommended a presidential budget chiefly in the interest
of improving governmental procedures. At the time of enactment, after the end of
the First World War, drastic reduction in federal spending had become a primary
objective of the Government, and presidential leadership in this effort was sought.
It was hoped that the executive budget would serve this purpose. Nevertheless,
some proponents of the legislation advocated that the staff work should be performed
by the Treasury Department in order to avoid an overlapping of functions between
the Treasury and an independent Budget Bureau. Our own precedents and the
British experience both warned of such a danger. But others recommended the
establishment of a Bureau of the Budget directly responsible to the President. The
advocates of an independent Bureau were fearful lest the Treasury should come to
exercise a decisive power over all other departments. Further, they argued that the
President could discharge his coordinating function only if he had at his disposal a
staff agency serving him directly and that a super-department like the British
Treasury was not suitable for the American system of government. This conflict
in viewpoint resulted in a compromise. The Director of the Budget was to be
appointed by the President and charged with assisting the President in his budget
making function. But the Bureau was "to be created in the Treasury Department."
This was an arrangement which fairly invited the Secretary of the Treasury to
regard the Budget Bureau as one of the offices under his jurisdiction. On the other
hand, it permitted the Director of the Budget to interpret his role as serving directly
under the President. This ambiguity created much confusion and embarrassment.
THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1939
The issue came to a head through the work of the President's Committee on
Administrative Management in 1937. This Committee had a task force on fiscal
management of which A. E. Buck was chairman. This task force recommended
that the Budget Bureau be made an integral part of the Treasury Department.
I
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The Committee itself (whose members were Louis Brownlow, Charles E. Merriam,
and Luther Gulick) reversed this recommendation. They favored the establishment
of an Executive Office of the President in which the Bureau of the Bugdet, along
with a few other staff agencies, would be located. Under the Reorganization Act
of i939, these recommendations became law.
In the Executive Office were placed also the National Resources Planning Board
and other agencies. In the field of public-works planning, both from the aspect
of supporting long-range economic growth and economic stabilization, the Budget
Bureau and the NRPB were given joint responsibilities by executive order. With
respect to the budget, the Treasury maintained a primary responsibility for advising
the President on the revenue side of the budget. Even after the establishment of
the Budget Bureau in the Executive Office, the Treasury continued to claim a
primary responsibility in advising the President on all matters of financial policy.
This situation resulted repeatedly in conflicts which the President had to resolve.
Secretaries of the Treasury made repeated attempts to reopen the issue of the position
of the Budget Bureau.2 Contrary to the practice of several other department heads,
the Secretary of the Treasury has, as far as I know, never, in person, attended a
hearing of the Budget Bureau in connection with appropriations for the Treasury
Department. There is an attitude which may be called an "institutional" objection
to the philosophy expressed by the Reorganization Act of 1939. Friction between
Treasury and Budget Bureau appears to have been sharpest during the years
following the Reorganization Act of 1939, when the Budget Bureau expanded rapidly
not only in staff, but also in its scope of responsibility and influence with the Presi-
dent. In recent years, during which the Budget Bureau has been markedly less
aggressive, there has been less occasion for friction and an improvement in working
relations is reported.
By the creation in the Executive Office of agencies concerned with fiscal and
economic matters, the President was given a more direct responsibility in these
fields than he would have had if the staff work had been lodged within the cabinet
departments. In this latter case, the President would still have the duty of trans-
mitting recommendations to Congress, but, in the absence of a staff in his own office,
he would have to rely much more on the advice of his cabinet members.
What then were the reasons which motivated the advocates of the Executive
Office solution? The following factors were, I believe, decisive in reaching a con-
clusion that may well be regarded as a milestone in the development of the
functions of the Presidency in the economic and fiscal field:
x. A recognition of the requirements of the presidential system, as distinct from
the cabinet system of government of, for example, Great Britain. The presidential
system requires an adequate staff in the Executive Office to assist the President in the
performance of the complex duties of present-day government.
-'Secretary Morgenthau submitted a specific proposal for a broad reorganization to the President and,
shortly before he left office, to Congress.
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2. A recognition that the budget function is not one among other functions of
government, but is the tool which can help in determining the resources to be al-
located to the various activities of government. It is a device for coordinating and
implementing the program of the Government.
3. From the experience of the depression emerged the conviction that over-all
budget and fiscal policy was, along with monetary policy, the most effective instru-
ment serving the objective of full employment and economic stabilization. This,
again, was a policy that sometimes involved the conflicting interests and responsi-
bilities of several departments, such as the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
Labor, Treasury, and others. Therefore, it was a function that would best be
performed under the President's direct responsibility.
4. A final argument cannot be found in explicit statements of the President's
Committee or in the congressional debate, but there was, I believe, the following
very important consideration. Each cabinet member and each department has, by
necessity, a special interest in the groups that are his special responsibility. The
Secretary of Agriculture has to look after the farm interests and is particularly
exposed to pressure from farm groups. In a similar way, each department has its
own particular "clientele." The President is supposed to represent the interests of
all the people, the general welfare. Can he do it simply by listening to advisers, each
of whom approaches the problem with the interests in mind of his particular group?
Cabinet members are no longer merely general advisers of the President, but have
become largely administrators of their particular departments and, to some extent,
trustees for one particular group of the population. This is an unavoidable and
by no means undesirable development in modern democracy. It requires, however,
a "countervailing power" within the setup of the Government. One argument in
favor of a central staff in the Executive Office concerned with fiscal and economic
matters is that it forms such a counterweight to the council of the trustees of
partial interests. According to this line of thinking, the staff of the Executive
Office is supposed to make effective the President's concern for the general ob-
jectives of government-which, for the lack of a better term, we call general welfare.
Only the President can decide the weight he wishes to give to the views of farm,
business, labor and financial groups, and the manner in which they are blended into
a program to promote the public interest. In making this decision, he needs the
assistance of staff agencies committed only to the formulation and implementation
of programs in the public interest.
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL FUNcTIoNs OF THE PRESIDENT DURING THE WAR
The Executive Office began to function in i939--at a time when the promotion
of economic recovery was the main concern of the President. In the over-all di-
rection of this task, he relied primarily on the staff work of the National Resources
Planning Board and the Budget Bureau. With the beginning of the defense pro-
gram in 1940, the liquidation of emergency activities (e.g., the Works Progress Ad-
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ministration and the National Youth Administration) had to be synchronized
with the increase in defense production. I believe that the New Deal emergency
activities could not have been liquidated so promptly had there not been a budget
agency working under the direct authority of the President.
During the war, priorities in the use of resources were established primarily
through devices of physical control rather than through the use of appropriations.
This shifted a major part of the responsibility to the War Production Board and
other agencies administering wartime controls. The Executive Office, through
the Budget Bureau's budget and management functions, kept in constant touch
with the functioning of these control agencies and, indirectly, had a considerable
impact on their policies. In addition, some of the supervisory control agencies
(e.g., the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion) were located in the Execu-
tive Office which facilitated over-all coordination.
In the fiscal and economic field, price stabilization became a major concern of
the President. This was a problem involving tax policy and debt management, as
well as price and wage controls. After 1941, the President had the Budget Bureau
working on these problems and reporting periodically to him. When prices
threatened to get out of hand, the President instructed the Budget Director in March
1942 to bring together the heads of departments and agencies involved and present
a plan to him for action. President Roosevelt's seven-point stabilization program
of April 1942 was the result. The Secretary of the Treasury did not take part in
the formulation of this program
Early in the war, the National Resources Planning Board began preparatory work
on postwar economic problems. Towards the end, when victory seemed to be only
a matter of time, various agencies of government, both in the legislative and
executive branches, together with private organizations, devoted an intensive effort
to postwar problems. There was concern that the same factors that made for the
depression of the thirties might reappear. In 1944, the President instructed the
Budget Director and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System to prepare a report for him on postwar economic stabilization policies.
The report utilized the work of various government and private agencies. The
President used the report as background material for various statements on
postwar policies (e.g., in the State of the Union Message of January 1945). It was
clear that the pursuit of a full employment and stabilization policy after the war
would become a major concern of the President.4
Tim EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946-THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT
This is not the place to recount the variety of proposals from within and without
the Government which finally resulted in the Employment Act of 19460 In the
Bu1REAu op THE BUDGET, TE UNITED STATES AT WAR 251 (1946).
'See Nourse, Defining Our Employment Goal Under the z946 Act, 38 REv. EcoN. & SrATIsT cs
193, 199 (1956).
. 6o STAT. 23, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1022-24 (946). See STEPHEN BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAw (i95o).
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development of the economic and fiscal functions of the Government in general, and
of the President in particular, this act is, next to the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921, the most important step ever taken. The act formalized responsibilities
that were already recognized as governmental and presidential duties. Again,
there was a sharp difference of opinion as to the proper organizational scheme.
There was one group that suggested the establishment of an independent national
economic commission which would make periodic reports on the economic outlook
and recommendations for appropriate economic and fiscal policies. These reports
would be submitted simultaneously to the President and Congress. The commission
was conceived as an independent agency, functioning as a kind of "Supreme Court
of Economics," even though its decisions were meant to be advisory only. This
view was incorporated in a bill of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments under the chairmanship of Congressman Menasco.
Another group suggested that making recommendations to Congress on eco-
nomic and fiscal policy was a duty of the President. The President should be free
to set up in the Executive Office (possibly in a reorganized Bureau of the Budget)
the staff needed to collect economic analyses from various government and private
sources and to coordinate policy recommendations of various agencies and to assist the
President in general in this function. This view was reflected in the original Mur-
ray bill in the Senate and the Patman bill in the House.
The final result was the Employment Act of 1946, which set up a Council of
Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President. Let us again see what
the issue was with respect to the economic and fiscal functions of the President.
Had there been established a national economic commission, the President would
not have needed to accept its advice, but it would have been difficult for him,
without proper staff, to question an "authoritative" advice made known to Congress
at the same time it should be submitted to him. This proposal seemed to imply
that it is always possible to give an economic appraisal and to suggest economic
policy independent of the Government's program as a whole.
The original proposal in the Murray-Patman bills followed the logic of develop-
ment under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Reorganization Act of
i939, making the President directly and fully responsible for economic and fiscal
recommendations. A President should not be able to blame an independent com-
mission if he fails in his economic and fiscal policies. He should be fully responsible
for selecting advisers in whom he has confidence and not be under any pressure
to follow advice which is not persuasive to him. This view has prevailed in the
final formulation of the law. How has it worked out?
President Truman stated on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Em-
ployment Act: "There is almost no other piece of domestic legislation enacted while
I was President to which I would attach equal significance."" Even though matters
O GERHAnD COLm (ED.), THE EMPLOYMENT Acr PAST AND FuruRE (National Planning Ass'n, Special
Report No. 4, 1956).
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of foreign policy demanded the President's primary attention, he took his responsi-
bility for budget and economic policies very seriously. The fight against inflation
became one of the crucial issues of government policy in 1948 and in Mr. Truman's
campaign of that year for re-election.
The book by Edwin Nourse, the first chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers, on Economics in the Public Service, reports that while President Truman
paid much attention to economic issues, he was ". . . not at all attracted by a
contemplative analysis of basic issues ... ,"7 but relied largely on horseback judg-
ment. President Truman's failure to "ponder" economic issues with Dr. Nourse
could be attributed not to a lack of interest in the economic issues on the side
of the President, but perhaps to the fact that he did not feel equal to discussing
economics with a man whom he respected as a great scholar and authority. He
wanted advice and sought it from many sources, both inside and outside the Gov-
ernment. In most cases, his actions were in accord with the advice given him by
the Council s This brings us to an important point. The degree to which the
President fulfills his functions in the economic and fiscal field cannot always be
measured by the frequency and duration of discussion with his economic advisers,
but must be judged by the policies expressed in the Economic Report and their
follow-up and implementation. We are dealing here, strictly speaking, not with
personal interests of the President, but with the functioning of the Presidency in
the economic and fiscal field. While the frequency of personal discussions are no
measurement of the Council's influence, it is probably true that frequent discussions
have a symbolic importance. The regular meetings of President Eisenhower with
Dr. Burns, in the presence of Dr. Hauge, probably have enhanced the prestige and
influence of the Council within the official family of the President and with the public
at large.
THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICIAL FAMILY
Very important for successful operation is a good understanding between the
Council and the members of the White House staff specializing in economics.
There is an advantage for the Council to be somewhat removed from the daily
routine as well as the daily excitement of the White House. The Council can fulfill
its function only if it has time as well as an atmosphere for reflection. The
Council members cannot fulfill their major function if they are involved in every
matter in the economics field brought to the attention of the White House; they
should be able, however, to bring their influence to bear on those issues in which
they feel that their analysis should be considered. The Council will find the proper
degree of participation in current issues only if there is a smooth working relation-
ship between the Council and the White House staff.
'EDWIN G. NoURSE, EcoNomics IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 374 (1953)-
'I recognize that accord between advice and action by the President may not only prove that the
President accepted advice, but also that the advisers avoided making recommendations which would be
hard for the President to accept.
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The Council should consist of economists of high professional qualifications in
"political economy." They should be in a position to advise the President, placing
current issues in the broad perspective of economic development. A White House
assistant primarily is an emissary, a writer, a spokesman for the President. The
members of the Council, on their part, can fulfill their function only if they have
full realization of, and respect for, the political requirements of the President. The
White House economic assistant can fulfill his function only if he has under-
standing and respect for the professional judgment of the economist. And yet,
basically there is a division of labor between the professional adviser and the ad-
ministrative assistant in the economic and fiscal field. From my experience, I can
say that between the Council and the White House staff there was developed a good
working relationship during the first five years of operation.
The White House staff must be particularly active in insuring that the various
presidential statements-the State of the Union Message, the Budget Message, the
Economic Report-are consistent with each other. The White House staff can also
help in the reconciliation of conflicts between the Council and various departments
and agencies. With the presidential assistants taking care of routine work (in-
cluding preparation of material for presidential speeches and statements), the
Council can concentrate on the task given to it under the Employment Act. As an
outsider, I have the impression that a very close and smooth working relationship
also exists under the present Council and the White House staff concerned with
economic affairsO
When the Council of Economic Advisers was set up, Harold D. Smith, who
had been Budget Director while the legislation was under consideration, believed
that difficulties in the relationship between the Budget Bureau and the Council were
likely to appear and that the arrangement provided under the Employment Act
would not last very long. Actually, no serious frictions have arisen, or, in any event,
none has come to public attention. The Budget Bureau has virtually liquidated its
fiscal division, which formerly did much of the work in the field of economic policy
coordination and formulation. It is my impression that at present a fairly close work-
ing relation exists between the Director of the Budget and the Chairman of the
Council but that a real procedure for relating economic programming and budgeting
to each other has not yet been worked out."
' The President's Assistant in charge of coordination of public works (Public Works Planning Unit) is
located in the White House. This group was set up originally under the Council of Economic Advisers,
and previously similar functions were fulfilled by a special unit in the Budget Bureau. The Hoover Com-
mission Task Force (see REPoRT oN REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 18 (1955)) recommended the estab-
lishment of such an agency in the Executive Office. The writer assumes that there were considerations
of expediency which resulted in the establishment of the Unit in the White House. Obviously this func-
tion requires closest cooperation with the Council and the Budget Bureau.
"The fact that Budget Bureau and Council are agencies in the Executive Office facilitates relationship,
in part because both are located in the same building and because both agencies directly serve the Presi-
dent. Otherwise, the Executive Office of the President has been largely a mere box in an organization
chart rather than an internally coordinated unit. What coordination has taken place within the Executive
Office is due mainly to good relationships among the heads of the various agencies and particularly to
good informal staff relationships.
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It is much more difficult to characterize in a few sentences the relationship be-
tween the Council and the cabinet officers. Cabinet officers quite naturally view with
misgiving the development of what may appear to them as a staff layer between
the President and themselves. The Bureau of the Budget has existed in the present
form for more than fifteen years, and cabinet members have more or less accepted
the fact that the Budget Director speaks usually with the authority of the Presi-
dent and that a personal recourse to the President in matters of appropriation has
rarely changed a determination which the Budget Director had made with the
approval of the President. Still not quite straightened out, however, is the relation-
ship between the estimates on the revenue side and on the expenditure side of the
budget, which are the responsibilities of the Treasury and Budget Bureau, re-
spectively. With respect to the fiscal year 1957 budget, some discrepancies between
the assumptions made for the revenue estimates and those for the expenditure esti-
mates were pointed out by the author at recent hearings.'
l
Shortly after the establishment of the Council, a procedure was developed which
was designed to give the Council a proper place in the process of economic program
development. The President sent a letter to all heads of departments and agencies
in the fall of each year asking them to submit their legislative proposals for the
next year and indicating that the Council would take up their proposals, as far
as they were related to economic policy. These proposals were then usually dis-
cussed with officials of the various departments. Task forces were formed for the
discussion of programs in which various agencies took an interest (e.g., public
works, small business problems, tax policy). In 1948, the President asked Dr.
Nourse to set up a cabinet committee under his chairmanship for the consideration
of an anti-inflation program.' Mr. Keyserling, after he became Chairman, was
asked by the President to participate in certain phases of the work of the National
Security Council. Similar assignments have repeatedly been given to the present
Chairman of the Council. 3 Under the present administration, a new organization
was established-the Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability-which is
a committee of a selected number of sub-cabinet officers. Reports about the workings
of this organization are most encouraging.
Thus, progress has been made towards establishing a clearer working relationship
between the Council and the various departments and agencies. Some department
heads have recognized that their recommendations found more careful considera-
tion when discussed with the Council or in the Advisory Board before being sub-
mitted to the President. In the end, a successful relationship can be established
only when the heads of the departments and agencies recognize that the Executive
22 See Hearings before the Joint Committee on January z956 Economic Report of the President, 84 th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12x ff. (1956). I would like to mention for the readers interested in this problem that
a specific method for making uniform assumptions was proposed in this testimony. See particularly, id.
at 135, 148.12 NounsE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 228 ff.
"' Of interest are the cabinet discussions during the recession of 1953-54, in which Dr. Burns actively
participated, as reported by ROBERT J. DoNovAN, THE INsIDE SroRY 209 ff. (x956).
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Office forms not only an additional layer in the bureaucratic hierarchy, but also
affords a channel through which adoption of meritorious proposals may be expe-
dited.
There is a very important function for the Council to fulfill with respect to the
coordination of programming activities by the various departments and agencies.
The formulation particularly of longer range plans for agriculture, water develop-
ment, energy development, even social security, and most other programs which
extend into the future, must be related to the desired and expected growth of the
economy (in the same fashion in which business investment programs are related
to general and specific economic bench marks). Orderly procedure requires that
consistent economic projections be used as assumptions for the programming by the
various departments and agencies. No agency is in a better position than the
Council to assist the various agencies in the development of consistent projections.
In the early postwar years, the Fiscal Division of the Budget Bureau experimented
with work along these lines with various agencies (e.g., the Department of Interior).
Similar work was later done informally by the Council staff but, to my knowledge,
has never been formalized into a recognized procedure. Recently, Dr. Burns in-
formed the Joint Economic Committee that the Council has been using economic
projections in the process of working out Government programs in collaboration
with various agencies.' 4  In several fields, the function of longer-range program
development must parallel the somewhat shorter-range budget development. In
this respect, the Council and Budget Bureau must work hand in hand.' 5 The
development of an appropriate procedure for this double purpose is still a task for
the future.
A special situation exists with respect to the relationship between the Executive
Office and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Until the onset
of the Great Depression, the monetary authority was looked upon as the main
weapon for mitigating economic fluctations. It was generally believed that it could
fulfill this function best if it were as independent as possible from Government
policy making. This belief was probably influenced by the experience that govern-
ments in emergency situations of the past had created money by currency debase-
ment. Therefore, it appeared safer to have the currency administered by an inde-
pendent agency. However, when in a real national emergency more money was
needed than could be raised by taxation or nonbanking loans, the central banks
always cooperated with the Government irrespective of their form of organization.
The Federal Reserve System is not independent of the Government. It is
created by legislation and reports regularly to the Congress. The decisions of the
, Dr. Burns, however, did not give the Joint Committee details about this procedure or about the
projections actually used. See Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee on the January z955
Economic Report of the President, 84 th Cong., Ist Sess. 43 (1955).
" For a proposal of inclusion in the Economic Report and Budget Message corresponding economic
projections and a budget outlook covering several years, see GER-MRD COLM, Tua FEDERAL BUDGET AND
THE NATIONAL ECONOmy (National Planning Ass'n Planning Pamphlet No. 90 1955).
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Board of Governors are not, however, subject to direction by the President. De-
cisions are made by vote of the Governors. The Governors have before them ample
information on economic conditions and are aware of the policies of the President
and the executive agencies in the economic and financial field. But, in the appraisal
of these facts, each Governor votes as his conscience guides him. This independence
in the decision of monetary policies might appear to be in conflict with the philosophy
of the Employment Act, which states that all the policies of the federal government
should be coordinated for accomplishing the objectives of the act. The Chairman
of the Board has repeatedly stated that, in the opinion of the Board, the Employ-
ment Act does apply to the policies of the Federal Reserve System."0 This means
that the policies of the Federal Reserve Board should be so directed as to contribute
to the accomplishments of the objectives of the Employment Act, unless these ob-
jectives are in conflict with other national objectives and obligations. This also
means that the President and the Joint Economic Committee, in their respective
reports, are bound to include analyses of the economic effects of, and recommenda-
tions for, Federal Reserve's policies. In this respect, there has been no difference
of opinion, as far as I know. The Board has always cooperated with both agencies
in the preparation of these reports. However, the Board has never conceded that
the President could direct the Board either to take or not to take any action con-
trary to the Board's own best judgment. If the Board can act independently of the
executive branch, instances may happen in which actions of the Board are not in
accord with the policies or opinions of the Executive Officej7
A most critical situation developed early in 195i when President Truman at-
tempted to keep the Federal Reserve policy in line with policies of the Secretary
of the Treasury. When the Board demurred, consideration was given to resorting
to wartime powers which would have given the Treasury the possibility of full
control over the credit policy in an emergency. Actually, the President asked the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the Director
of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to
propose a credit policy which would help in curbing inflation and, at the same time,
maintain stability in the federal security markets. When work on a joint report
was nearing completion, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board announced
their "accord" of March 4, 1951. Some observers believed that this accord was
"6 Chairman William McC. Martin stated, for instance, before a subcommittee of the Joint Economic
Committee on March i, 1952: "I am accepting the Employment Act of 1946 as national policy and
being applicable to the Federal Reserve System." See Hearings before the Subcommittee on General
Credit Control and Debt Management of the Joint Economic Comnmittee on Monetary Policy and the Man-
agement of the Public Debt, 8"d Cong., 2d Sess. 8i (195",).
'The latest instance was the increase in the discount rate of certain Federal banks in April 1956.
See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the joint Economic Committee on
Conflicting Official Views on Monetary Policy, 84 th Cong., ad Sess. (1956). In this connection, see
also the President's statement at his press conference on April 25, 1956: "1 really personally believe it
would be a mistake to make [the Federal Reserve Board] definitely and directly responsible to the
political head of the State." N. Y. Times, April 26, 1956, p. 16, col. 6.
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expedited by the desire of the two agencies to resolve the problem without a recon-
ciliation brought about with the help of the Executive Office of the President. s
The independence of the Federal Reserve System has advantages, and the dis-
advantages may not be serious as long as the members of the Board clearly recognize
that the System is committed by the Employment Act to cooperate in the pursuit
of the objectives of the act. It is equally important for the executive agencies
and the Board to recognize that the Federal Reserve and Treasury policies of debt
management have to dovetail with each other and with the President's general
economic and fiscal policy. With the clear recognition of these interrelationships
the legal form of organization becomes less important. Nevertheless, here lies a
problem which at some future time may become acute again."0
COUNCIL RELATIONSHIP TO ECONOMIC GROUPS AND PUBLIC
The Employment Act requires that economic policies under the act shall be
determined in consultation and cooperation with private groups of industry, agri-
culture, employees, consumers, and state and local governments. The first Council,
following the suggestion of the act, established several advisory committees and
held periodic meetings with each group-usually four times a year.
The present Council believes that it has lived up to the requirements of the
act by informal consultation with various interested groups. However, a feeling
is expressed by representatives of these groups that the consultation has not been
adequate ° The Council does have periodic consultation with academic economists.
COUNCIL RELATIONSHIP TO CONGRESS
No problem has plagued the Council more than the difficulty in establishing a
workable relationship with Congress, especially the Joint Economic Committee.
Dr. Nourse,2 ' Dr. Burns,22 and Mr. Keyserling 3 have each expressed a different
view. Dr. Nourse found testifying before a congressional committee inconsistent
with the role of a confidential presidential adviser. Dr. Burns felt that Council
members "should respond affirmatively to an invitation to testify before the
Joint Committee." "It is ,equally clear to me," he continued in his letter, "that
-except in the case of technical discussions such as those of the Subcommittee
on Economic Statistics-the testimony should be given at an executive session and
"I See NouRsE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 388.
1" Neil H. Jacoby, former member of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers, discusses
in his book, Can Prosperity Be Sustained? (1956), the need to coordinate tax and expenditure policies
on the one hand, and monetary policy on the other, and states (at p. 94) that "the President's Council
-of Economic Advisers has the job of bringing about the necessary coordination."
o See COLM, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8o, 185.
o For Dr. Nourse's view, see his book, op. cit. supra note 7.
For Dr. Burns' view, see various statements he made to the Joint Economic Committee, e.g., Hear-
ings, supra note 14, at 4 if., and particularly his letter of Feb. 3, 1956, to the Chairman of the Joint
Economic Committee and the answer by the Chairman of Feb. 27, 1956. Id. at 688, 69o.
2' For Mr. Keyserling's views, see his statement in Hearings, supra note x6, at z86 ff. See also his
article, The Council of Economic Advisers' Tas ks in the Next Decade, in COLm, op. cit. supra note 6, at
L66 ff.
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without a transcript."24  I believe that both Dr. Nourse and Dr. Burns felt that
questions asked by Committee members about the advice given could drive a wedge
between the President and the Council and interfere with the confidential relation-
ship between the President and his advisers. Mr. Keyserling's view was that the
privilege of denying testimony applies only to the personal assistants of the Presi-
dent, that is, the White House staff. Heads and staff members of the Budget
Bureau and other agencies in the Executive Office are testifying frequently, and there
seems to be no convincing reason for the Council to have a different status in this
respect. It is also said that Congress can rightly expect to obtain views on the
economic outlook on which the economic policy conclusions are based.25 The present
author sees more validity in the latter view. He believes in the light of the experi-
ence of these ten years that:
i. Full cooperation between the Council of Economic Advisers and the Joint
Economic Committee is essential for a successful operation under the Employment
Act.
2. The Joint Economic Committee has a right to hear on the record the views
of the Council on the economic prospects and the effects of various government
policies as background for a consideration of the President's recommendations
presented in the Report.
3. The Council members should (and are entitled to) refuse to answer questions
which probe into confidential advice given to the President, unless the President
has consented that such information be given either on or off the record.
4. Matters of serious conflict of opinion in the preparation of the Economic Report
usually affect not only the President and his Council, but also officers of other
departments and agencies. Therefore, Committee members can ask these agencies
about possible conflict in the preparation of the Report. All officers in the Execu-
tive branch will avoid discussing the manner in which the President determines
policy unless they are authorized to do so.
5. Because many pieces of legislation have an economic aspect, the Council
would be called upon to testify so often that their regular work could suffer. There-
fore, it would be a desirable rule that the Council should testify only before the
Joint Economic Committee (besides the Appropriation Committee and besides hear-
ings at the occasion of confirmation). If another committee has pending important
economic legislation, it should ask the Joint Economic Committee to conduct the
hearings with members of the legislative committee permitted to be present and to
participate in the interrogation.
CONCLUSION
We have had an experience of almost twenty years with three different Presi-
dents since the Executive Office was established. This period covered the end of
"See his letter of Feb. 3, 1956, in Hearings, supra note 14, at 688.
" For the congressional view on this controversy, see the letter by Senator Paul Douglas, the Chair-
man of the Joint Committee, Hearings, supra note 14, at 69o.
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a prolonged depression, the Second World War, the Korean War, and the cold
war, periods of demobilization and rearmament, recessions and booms. Each of
these periods presented different problems in the fiscal and economic field; each
of the Presidents had different work methods; and Congress established and rescinded
various agencies in the Executive Office.
The experience seems to suggest that under all these conditions, an effective
organization in the Executive Office was essential to enable the President to dis-
charge his functions. The philosophy of the Reorganization Act of 1939 has stood
the severe test of these times. Great progress has been made in establishing good
working relations between the economic and budget agencies within the Executive
Office on the one hand, the White House staff, departments, and agencies on the
other. However, the relationships with the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board
are not yet finally straightened out. Also, the development of a unified procedure
for longer range program development, parallel to the procedure for budget de-
velopment, is still at the beginning. In the relationships of agencies in the Executive
Office to the Congress and the public, there are still a number of unsettled questions.
Nevertheless, there is no longer a real question either in Congress or in the public
mind about the President's basic responsibility for the conduct of fiscal and eco-
nomic policy and about the need to provide adequate staff services for these functions
in the Executive Office.
